A nova Lei de Improbidade Administrativa e o desempenho do funcionalismo público: burocracia que protege ou corrupção que avança?

Abstract

This study analyzes the impacts of Law No. 14,230/2021, which substantially amended the Administrative Improbity Law (LIA), on the performance of Brazilian public servants. The objective is to investigate how the transition from a punishment regime based on negligence to the requirement of specific intent (dolus) influences administrative efficiency and the "decision-making paralysis" phenomenon (apagão das canetas). The justification lies in the need to understand whether the relaxation of improbity rules serves as a protection mechanism for the upright manager or weakens the fight against corruption. The central hypothesis maintains that, although the new law offers greater legal certainty to the bureaucrat by reducing the fear of accountability for merely formal errors, it imposes evidentiary challenges that may hinder the punishment of illicit acts. Regarding the theoretical-methodological aspects, the research is classified as qualitative and bibliographic, based on the analysis of legislation, specialized doctrine, and jurisprudence from superior courts. The results obtained demonstrate that a new LIA (Law of Administrative Improbity) tends to mitigate the administrative inertia caused by receiving disproportionate evaluations. However, the requirement of specific intent and the repeal of the negligent modality exclude a strengthening of democracy, an institutional refinement of the State and of citizens' trust in institutions, to avoid gaps in the repression of acts that threaten public assets and administrative morality.